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MAREK KWIEK 
ON THE TRAGIC DIFFEREND 
(Dilemmas of Lyotard — Dilemmas of Postmodernity) 
1. 
One can get the impression that postmodern thought — together with the world of 
postmodernity that surrounds us — has been deprived of the tragic, being "flattened" or 
"de-dramatized"1. Postmodern thinkers are often reproached for depriving their world 
of unresolvable conflicts, of contradictions, reproached for making it simple and 
comprehensible (Richard Rorty may serve as a paradigmatic object of criticism that 
goes along these lines, perhaps not without some reason). The tragic is supposed to 
have disappeared from philosophy upon the arrival of the existentialist absurd and to 
have never come back; the world is supposed to have lost for ever its apocalyptic 
dimension... And yet, despite various diagnoses and readings critical of postmoder-
nism, one can show in postmodern reflection such points in which there may be the 
(irreducible) tragic, whose dramatic character strikes us as if the world had not been 
totally disenchanted of katharsis... Let us consider as an example the philosophical 
thought of Jean-François Lyotard. 
In order to be able to discuss the possibility of "the tragic" in today's world, I would 
like to do in the present essay two things at the same time: first, I would like to present 
1  The impression of "de-dramatization" of the world is especially evident in some texts of 
Baudrillard and Bauman. In the Baudrillardian societe de consommation, the citizen — i.e. today 
primarily the consumer — is subjected to the "constraint" of happiness and pleasure. He simply, as 
Baudrillard says, "has no right not to be happy", otherwise he becomes "asocial" (J. Baudrillard, 
Selected Writings, ed. M. Poster, Oxford 1988, p. 48). In Bauman's postmodern world there is no 
determination — nor chance or contingency, the world of games "offers neither certainty nor despair; 
only the joy of a right move and the grief of a failed one" (Z. Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other 
Life Strategies, Oxford 1992, p. 187). The world of games and moves, without contingency — thus 
without responsibility and ethical choices - is the world that we cannot see around us and, besides, it 
is in our view the world of deadly boredom... 
2 See in this context my English book Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and 
Postmodern Thought, Wyd. Naukowe IF UAM, 1996. 
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briefly the Lyotardian project of the differend (le différend) presented in his most 
significant — as he admits himself — philosophical work, entitled precisely Le Différend 
and, second, I would like to present a particular application of the project to more than 
a literary conflict of two reasons from Antigone (that of Antigone and that of Creon, 
obviously). The task seems not to be easy and requires the division of one's attention 
between two parallel planes of argumentation as well as some prudence because 
Lyotard does not provide us with any typical tools of analysis, not to mention any 
ready-to-use "method". The present essay has been born out of the search of a 
non-philosophical exemplification of a philosophical proposal in question, strongly 
lacking in Lyotard's writings. I get the impression that mutual and simultaneous 
interpenetration of both — literary and philosophical — threads might lead to a better 
elucidation of a philosophical content of his work. That will be, let us admit at the very 
beginning, a work of the Lévi-Straussian bricoleur, a philosophical tinker who unites 
discourses of (Greek) literature and (postmodern, as well as Hegelian) philosophy, 
mixes together different epochs, crosses borders of cultures and genres. One could 
question the legitimacy of such collage-like procedures but we think to be justified by 
the conviction that what is at stake is not one truth about Sophocles or about Hegel 
(nor that of Antigone or Socrates) as — within today's horizon — there are no such truths. 
What is at stake is rather a new recontextualization, as Richard Rorty would say, in 
this particular case locating an old, almost mythical question of judging Antigone's 
reasons and Creon's reasons within a new context imposed by postmodernity. 
Let us begin with Le Différend. The book consists of 264 philosophical fragments 
arranged in seven parts which cover the problematics of the differend, the referent and 
the Name, presentation, result (Resultat of thinking), obligation, genres and norms as 
well as the signs of history, interspersed with deep and extremely erudite commentaries 
(notices) which refer to Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato, Antistenes, Aristotle, together with 
Kant, Hegel and Lévinas. Besides, a single commentary is devoted to Gertrude Stein's 
writings, another one to the Declaration of 1789 and, finally, still another one to a tribe 
of Cashinahua Indians who appear in many Lyotard's writings. The proper text is 
preceded by a text entitled Fiche de lecture — a partially ironic, partially parodic 
"summary", so to speak, of the whole work which will allow the, reader, "if the fancy 
grabs him or her, to 'talk about the book' without having read it"3 within an epoch one 
of chief features of which is "gaining time". That dossier which precedes the proper 
philosophical notebook of sketches (as Le Différend undoubtedly can be 'read) deserves 
in itself a moment of our attention. It describes or explains e.g. the title of the book, 
its object, thesis, philosophical context, as well as its reader, presenting a parody of a 
certain style of reading (not only philosophy). The situation a reader faces is seemingly 
strange — the author himself presents a (conceptual) summary of his book so that a 
3 J.-F. Lyotard, Le Différend, Minuit 1983 (English translation by Georges Van Den Abbeele: The 
Differend. Phrases in Dispute, Manchester, 1988, hereafter references in the text will be given as LD, 
followed either by page number or paragraph number; LD, p. 13. 
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reader could know - with paralyzing certainty — "what is at stake" in it. He could master 
the book intellectually even before he has actually approached it. So it may turn Out 
that the very act of reading will become just a "waste of time" (Lyotard remarks sadly 
that "reflection is not thrust aside today because it is dangerous or upsetting, but simply 
because it is a waste of time. It is 'good for nothing', it is not good for gaining time. 
For success is gaining time", LD, p. xv). Reading takes too much time if one can get 
the "content" or the "message" of a book in the form of a ready extract4. And yet — as 
a reader should be "a philosophical one, that is, anybody" (LD, p. xiv) — Lyotard 
presents a parody of such a reading that performs merely a conceptual reduction, which 
reduces comprehension of a work of philosophy to "possessing" its meaning. For 
reading (like judging) should be directed towards the singularity of a text (of an event). 
Thus just as judging in Lyotard's account assumes the anti-universalistic shape of 
judging a particular event on the basis of individual criteria forged especially for this 
occasion, it may also be the case that reading is a process of listening to a text in search 
of its peculiarities, its uniqueness (precisely therefore this sensibilité la singularite du 
cas5, sensibility to singularity of a case, is necessary) rather than it is a process of 
reducing a text to its "meaning" in already familiar concepts6. And perhaps the Preface 
to The Differend is supposed to serve just this function of expressing Lyotard's disgust 
with such kind of reading philosophical texts and to make us sensitive to quid (that 
something is happening) rather than to quod (what is happening). The introduction in 
inverted commas says that "the time has come to philosophize" — to philosophize, let 
us add, without dreams of a telos, without designing vast, utopian social "emancipa-
tory" visions and, finally, to philosophize in narratives rather than in intellectual and 
abstract theories; in other words, the time has come to be "pagan", to "bear witness to 
differends" and to "save the honour of thinking" which, as he writes in his autobio-
graphical Peregrinations, requires "much subtlety (finesse) in the perception of small 
differences"7. 
Let us begin with the Lyotardian conception of a differend. Lyotard says at the very 
beginning that "as distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of 
conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a 
rule of judgment applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply 
the other's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgment to both in 
order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at 
least) one of them (and both of them if neither side admits this rule)" (LD, p. xi). A 
consequent wrong comes from the fact that the rules of the genre of discourse on the 
basis of which judging is taking place are not the rules of a genre or genres of discourse 
being judged. Thus a wrong — to use Lyotard's words — is a "damage accompanied by 
4 B. Readings, Introducing Lyotard, London 1991, p. xix. 
5 J.-F. Lyotard, Pérérgrinations. Loi, forme, événement, Paris 1990, p. 26. 
6 As it is worth noting that it was already in La condition postmodern e that Lyotard wrote that "work 
and text have the characters of an event'. The Postmodern Condition, Manchester 1984, p. 81. 
7 J.-F. Lyotard, Pérérgrinations. Loi, forme, événement, p. 41. 
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the loss of means to prove the damage" (LD, §7). This is the case if the victim is 
deprived of life, of his or her liberties, of freedom to express public opinions or, to put 
it in the simplest way, when a sentence which bears witness to a wrong is (structurally) 
devoid of any meaning. In a word, a victim is deprived of the possibility to disclose 
his or her knowledge about a wrong to anyone else, including the tribunal before which 
it might possibly be judged. The difference between a plaintiff and a victim is the 
following: a plaintiff is someone who has suffered damage and possesses means to 
prove it; he becomes a victim when presenting a wrong — expressing suffering — is 
impossible. The pair of plaintiff/litigation is symmetrical with the pair of victim/diffe-
rend: a litigation becomes a differend when a plaintiff is divested of the means to argue 
— when he or she is forced to remain silent — and becomes for that reason a victim (let 
us mention e.g. the case in which an author of damages is then a judge of them). "A 
case of a differend between parties takes place when the 'regulation' of the conflict 
that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered 
by the other is not signified in that idiom", says Lyotard (LD, §12). To bear witness to 
a differend — as this is according to Lyotard as much as the philosopher can dare — is 
to create the possibility of expressing a wrong. What is needed is a new idiom, new 
"prudence" (or Greek phronesis). Philosophers, seeing that not everything can be held 
in sentences, that certain sentences exceed the existing discourse, should "institute 
idioms which do not yet exist" (LD, §23). If a victim could phrase the wrong it suffers 
— could present it to a tribunal to be judged — he or she would merely be a plaintiff as 
there would be no structure within which he or she could be forced to keep silence. A 
paradigm of a victim is — for obvious reasons — an animal8. 
2. 
The event (occurence, événement) is a radically singular occurrence which for this 
reason cannot be presented within a framework of a general narrative without the loss 
of its singularity9. Writing after an event — that is to say, linking phrases (phrases) to 
it, should express its singularity: Lyotard's question appearing throughout the book 
8  Richard Rorty wrote about the impossibility of existence of the "language of victims" — of the 
idiom that Lyotard searches — while analyzing Orwell's work in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge, 1989). forty is obviously right if we take into consideration the time which accompanies 
victims' wrong but he is wrong if we realize that a "victim himself" is not capable of phrasing his wrong. 
What is needed is an idiom to be forged later, a new representational framework in which (as in a new 
horizon of sense) a wrong will appear precisely as a wrong rather than as a damage. The Foucault -
Derrida conflict about the Madness and Civilization was just about that: can one "give voice back to 
those deprived of it", without reinforcing the power of voice over silence, the power of rationality over 
madness? To give voice to madness itself makes the book 'impossible", as Derrida states in "Cogito 
and the History of Madness" (in Writing and Difference, Chicago, 1978), as madness is l'absence de 
l'oeuvre. 
9  As Bill Readings says about Auschwitz: "the event is the occurrence after which nothing will ever 
be the same again", op. cit., p. 57. 
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about the differend is that of Theodor W. Adorno: "how to philosophize 'after 
Auschwitz'?"; and he gives it a new meaning — namely, how to link phrases about the 
unpresentable horror of the death camp responsibly (ethically?) without at the same 
time presenting this horror? Other events which are often "signs of history" are, for 
instance, the French Revolution (whose significance as Begebenheit Kant immediately 
perceived in his The Conflict of the Faculties) or May '68, and looking back towards 
the more distant past — let us add, going beyond Lyotard, as that will be necessary for 
a further analysis — the gradual separation of ethics and politics in the times of, as Hegel 
puts it in his Phenomenology, "stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness". 
Antigone and Creon were literary witnesses of this Lyotardian in spirit (although, 
as a matter of fact, imposed upon him by the author of the present essay, which is worth 
being kept in mind) événement. On the one side in this conflict there is the "law of 
shadows" — relentless necessity to bury one's brother's body, on the other side there 
is the law of a "bright day" (as Hegel calls them)1° which does not allow under any 
circumstances to entomb a traitor. In Antigone there is thus a clash of two separate 
orders - that of a family, of blood ties and obligations of kinship on the one hand, and 
that of the citizen on the other. The divine law is not commensurable with the human 
law. Hegel says that an "acting consciousness can neither negate that it has committed 
a crime, nor can it negate its fault". The situation of Antigone is "a tragic collision 
between a duty and a lawless reality". 
There is no possibility of finding a common language between the two protagonists; 
Antigone and Creon seem not so much to be in an opposition as they rather seem to 
be incommensurably, radically different because they express two different worlds: a  
primitive world of ethical unity and a new world of separated ethics and politics . 
Their linguistic games remain mutually untranslatable: there is no possibility of finding 
common criteria of judgment which could be accepted by both sides of that differend. 
The acceptance of a perspective (language, criteria, laws) of one of the sides irresistibly 
l0  G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, vol. 2, the analysis from the chapter "True Spirit. 
Objective Ethics (Sittlichkeit)" (pp. 5-52 in a Polish translation). 
11 It is one of many possible interpretations of Antigone, worth mentioning at least due to its 
persistent presence in the culture of modem Europe. Antigone - like sophists and Socrates - witnesses 
the destruction of the ancient polls, the disintegration of the Aristotelian household (oikos) into morality 
on the one hand and the Roman law on the other. The two aspects of the disintegration in question 
are dealt with in two Hegelian masterpieces: the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right. 
When the split of ethics and politics was started in stoicism, at the same time man ceased to be only 
a citizen, he started to belong to two orders, a moral and a political one. It was for the first time in human 
history that "private man opposes particularities of his own needs to common life, society and the state" 
(p. 63). The Roman citizen no longer fights — he has to work for himself as a private owner, for money 
and property. Instead of "constantly waging prestigious wars" (i.e. wars for respect), as Alexandre 
Kojève says, he for the first time becomes an individual, accepting simultaneously ideologies of his 
slaves - stoicism, scepticism and Christianity. On the radical split between ethics and politics in stoicism 
see J.-M. Palmier, Hegel, Paris 1968, pp. 59-63; J. Szacki, Historia myśli socjologicznej, Warsaw, pp. 
46-50 or Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 157-161 and A. Kojève Introduction to the 
Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the 'Phenomenology of Spirit', Allan Bloom (ed.), Ithaca, 1980. 
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gives birth to a wrong on the other side, as we know from Lyotard's analyses of the 
differend in his book. It is a differend of opposite reasons every one of which - within 
a framework of its own linguistic game — would be an acceptable one. But brought 
together in the figures of Antigone, they begin a deadly differend12. 
The tragic — excellently perceived and exposed by Hegel — consists in both Creon's 
and Antigone's being right. There is no good way out of a thereby created differend: 
Antigone's wrong is accompanied by the said lack of means to prove it (in Creon's 
world of separated ethical and political orders in which a private sphere is separated 
from a public space), whereas in an opposite case a violation of a public sphere (a 
never-avenged treason, a posthumous fate of a traitor of homeland the same as that of 
its defender) would require to be phrased and actually could not be presented in an 
incommensurable world of blood ties in which Antigone still lives. 
That seems to be a classical case of a differend (rather than a litigation) in Lyotard's 
sense of the term. Why would it not be a litigation? Because there is no common 
discourse, no common "we" shared by both sides. There is no instance to judge 
"reasons" of both sides that would be acceptable by them. The conflict cannot be 
resolved without making use of the language (of the whole world in fact) of one of the 
two sides, and it is for this reason that it is not a case of a litigation. What is needed 
for a litigation is just a code, as well as laws, judges — and an accepted court sentence. 
In the case of a differend there is no such a possibility. Choosing the universe of one 
of the sides, we are "doing wrong" to the other one, we deprive it of the right of defence 
in a neutral vocabulary of an uncommitted judge. 
Antigone and Creon speak radically different languages and their conflict of 
reasons cannot be expressed in any of them without doing "injustice", without prejud-
ging, by means of the idiom used, which of the two sides is "right". (Either we speak 
the language of a premodern unsocialized world — and then Creon turns out to be a 
tyrant who illogically insists on an incomprehensible law, or we speak the language of 
a modem, i.e. socialized world in which Antigone, let us beg the reader's pardon in 
advance, turns out to be a hysterical neurotic, additionally driven by the will to death). 
Let us stop for a while by certain classical accounts of the tragic. Max Scheler, for 
instance, as his commentators stress, assumed as the first since Aristotle that the tragic 
is a category of life rather than of art — that is to say, that it is aesthetical rather than 
ethical (he said: "the tragic is rather an element of life itself'13). So in order to be able 
to talk about the possibility of a "tragic differend" in Lyotard, we have to first follow 
Scheler's paths of understanding the tragic - as the Aristotelian definition saying that 
the tragic is what "bears compassion and fear" will not be of any use for us here. In the 
most general terms, a tragic world, according to Scheler, requires values because: "In 
the world deprived of values (...) there is no tragedy"14. Only such a conflict can be 
12  For us today it is a "conflict of values", while Antigone at her time was certain of being "totally 
right", says Charles Taylor, op. cit, p. 175. 
13 M. Scheler, "0 zjawisku tragiczności" [On the Phenomenon of the Tragic], Krakow 1976, p. 51. 
14 M. Scheler, ibidem, p. 58. 
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tragic which arises between subjects possessing some high positive value —for instance 
between highly ethical individuals. Not only both sides of the conflict "are right", but 
also each of the individuals taking part in it "represents equally sublime law or seems 
to have and to fulfil equally sublime duty". In everything that is tragic there is the 
necessity and unavoidability of the destruction of values. (Therefore, let us add, the 
"differend" between Antigone and Creon is tragic in the sense suggested here, but a 
classical example of differend shown by Lyotard, namely Auschwitz, is not tragic 
unless in the abandoned by us sense of the Aristotelian katharsis, compassion and fear). 
There is also no tragedy when one is capable of answering clearly the question: "who 
is to be blamed?". What belongs both to the essence of the Lyotardian differend, as 
well as to the essence of a tragic conflict in Max Scheler's account is that "even the 
most ideal, the wisest and the most just judge is not able to soften or heal it". For what 
the Lyotardian judge lacks are universal criteria: he still has to forge them for a 
particular case. Just as in Scheler's view a conflict which can still be ethically or legally 
solved is not tragic, in Lyotard's view the conflict at stake would not be a differend, 
but merely a litigation. Let us also add here that Scheler to a large extent supports his 
analysis of the phenomenon of the tragic by Hegel's classical intuitions. Although the 
name of Hegel, just as these of Antigone and Socrates, does not occur in his study, 
nevertheless one can feel while reading it a subterraneouscourse of the Hegelian 
reflection. 
We can say that our world — modern world — still looks at Antigone with the eyes 
(and analyses with the language) of Creon. Thus, to apply our criteria — just like to 
apply his criteria — would make Antigone a Lyotardian "victim" (as she would not have 
any possibility of demonstrating her wrong — which is incomprehensible and reaso-
nably inexpressible out of the context of the idiom of ancient myths about Hades and 
obligations of blood). To apply them would bear injustice to her. 
So we might be allowed to look at this classical conflict with different eyes (which, 
obviously, do not exist, and which is precisely why differends remain for ever 
unresolvable) — not in order to resolve them but to add our thoughts about these times, 
to link our sentences (phrases) to the existing ones, to think at the same time after 
Sophocles and after Lyotard, forming an idiom which would "save the honour of 
thinking", as the latter puts it. As what is at stake is to phrase (or express) a differend 
rather than to resolve it because a differend — contrary to a litigation — must remain 
always open. Its resolution transforms a differend into a mere litigation, depriving it 
of its specific character. When a differend becomes a litigation, one of the sides (and 
sometimes two of them, or all of them) becomes a victim. Its wrong cannot be 
expressed, put in phrases, subsiding into silence. Lyotard does not identify himself 
with an (ideological, theoretical and always conceptualizing) "intellectual", perhaps 
best described in his Tonibeau de l'intellectuel et autres papiers: he is a "philosopher" 
whose "responsibility before thought consists ... in detecting differends and in finding 
the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them" (LD, p. 142). The intellectual smoothes a 
violent surface of social life, helps to forget about the existence of differends, first 
transforming them into litigations and then resolving. 
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3. 
A differend always occurs between two (incommensurable) language games, two 
little narratives — as what results from incommensurability, a radical difference, is the 
impossibility to find and to apply common criteria to pass a judgement. The existing 
criteria, well settled, fixed and obligatory representational frameworks, do not suffice 
to judge a difference unless one wants to reduce or repress it, annihilate it, make it keep 
silence. The difference at stake — i.e. a differend— cannot be phrased at a given moment. 
It is only later, sometimes much later, within a framework of new representational 
rules, that one can try to show it in a new idiom formed particularly for that case (just 
as the singularity of Auschwitz disappears the moment it is not regarded — following 
Adorno — as a breach in a speculative discourse of reality and rationality: it is then 
merely one among many atrocities). 
In Lyotard's view the task of art, philosophy or aesthetics in our (post-metaphysical 
and post-metanarrative) epoch is, as a matter of fact, detecting, bringing to light and 
bearing witness to all differends with one aim in mind: to resist injustice which 
"deprives of voice those who cannot speak the language of the master"15. 
Antigone is bound to lose (although it is worth bearing in mind that the chorus takes 
her side in the play). Her world no longer exists. A homogeneous unity of the private 
and the public, of the man and the citizen, is already a thing of a past. The "differend" 
finds here no other solution than a tragic one. Oedipus' daughter is not able to prove 
that her conduct is right; in a new world of newly split obligations it is Creon who has 
a reason, evidence before a possible tribunal and, finally, power at his disposal. It is 
Creon who - let us add — is not a tyrant, nor destroys a weak individual in the name of 
utopian reasons or pathological ambitions, but who is just a legalist in the world of 
politics. Although in the end he gives up and changes his mind (not without the 
influence of Teiresias' prophecies), it is too late anyway. The last act of the tragedy is 
completed. For the mechanism of "wrong" has been set in motion. The tragic event, 
i.e. death, happens. We feel compassion for Antigone but also Creon is not a less tragic 
hero. 
It is also another time that the two orders (Lyotard would say: two genres of a 
discourse) that have just been separated from each other, that is ethics and politics, turn 
out to be incommensurable, take opposite sides after the destruction of Greek oikos; 
one has to bear in mind, at the same time, that every attempt to unite them once again 
— when "power" belongs to "virtue", as Hegel says in Phenomenology, as Jacobeans 
and Bolsheviks had wanted — gives birth to terror (and then heads go down like 
"cabbage-heads"). It looked some time ago as if philosophy might be an adjucating 
tribunal in controversial cases. Today it is a more and more common view that also 
philosophy is just one more genre of a discourse, and a philosopher may be merely "a 
15 As Readings puts it in op.cit, p. xxx. 
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kind of writer" (philosophy being "a kind of writing", as Rorty once provocatively 
wrote in his Consequences of Pragmatism). 
Thus, the conflict of Antigone's and Creon's opposite reasons becomes in our 
account a "differend" of incommensurable orders. Could one say, non-historically, so 
to speak, who "was right" in this particular differend? One could not do that, I suppose, 
without privileging one of the sides, that is to say, without doing wrong to the other. 
The classical opposition: either Antigone or Creon, either family obligations or public 
obligations, cannot be maintained (as we leave aside here the interpretation starting 
from the choice made by Antigone herself, at stake being placing of two worlds side 
by side rather than dealing with the psychology of the heroine). Is there a good 
"resolution" from such a perspective? 
Perhaps one could "write narratives", "build micrologies" after what had happened 
in Antigone. Lyotard says: "let us wage a war to totality", "let us activate 
differends" - not so that we could confront an old totality with a new one or so that we could "resolve" 
differends (unresolvable without a "wrong"), but so that we could know something 
new, say something which cannot be phrased in the case of a homogeneous paradigm 
of the human nature. Perhaps the following could be stated: it is impossible to 
adjudicate Creon's "reasons" and Antigone's "reasons" within a classical account of 
the humanistic whole which bears the collective name of "man". Creon and Antigone 
- pushing the differences between them to perhaps too grotesque extremities — come 
from different cultures, different worlds which remain "impenetrable" to each other 
(i.e. the two do not share much in common as "people"). There is not any God's eye 
view which would allow us to make a super-cultural analysis and a super-cultural 
adjudication of both "reasons". There is no strict cultural translation 6. Cultural 
differences cannot be abandoned in some "objective" gaze of the uncommitted re-
searcher or judge. The world of Antigone, her culture (like pre-Socratic world and 
culture) do not exist, just as they had already not existed in the literary space governed 
by Creon. Although they did share a common (Greek) language, the universes built 
upon it were incommensurable and untranslatable, mutually incommunicable. Anti-
gone was right in her own world, Creon was right in his own. But none of them could 
rely upon a just judgment of a super-cultural judge. Their "differend" could be resolved 
by Gods only, man entangled in his culture — in Antigone paradoxically still coexisting 
16  A similar argumentative course is taken by Bill Readings somewhere else — in his analysis of 
Werner Herzog's film "Where Green Ants Dream": for Aborigines from whom the Whites want to buy 
land the place at stake is a hole one. The formers' language is untranslatable in the language of the 
court of law, heterogeneous with respect to the juridical language. Their identity as "men" would be 
imposed on them (see "Pagans, Perverts or Primitives? Experimental Justice in the Empire of Capital" 
in: Judging Lyotard, ed. A. Benjamin, London 1992). 
There is no common, shared "human nature" - says Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 
personality is a "web of contingent beliefs and desires". There is no common "we" for Antigone and for 
Creon, just as there is no common "we" for Aborigines and Westerners (Readings), Cashinahua Indians 
and Europeans (Lyotard) or Serbs and Americans (R. Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Senti-
mentality", a typescript). 
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in the same time and in the same place — could not do that. The world of the, "divine 
law" and that of the "human law" according to Hegel's Phenomenology are the two 
worlds of two different (contradictory) forms of objective ethics (Sittlichkeit): a family 
and the state. To follow the duties of one law immediately results in the revenge of the 
other law. The other, opposite ethical power brings about only destruction. In le 
différend from Sophocle's Antigone a pre-modern or ancient world and a modern world 
face each other, two different ethical orders confront each other, one of them basing 
itself on an irrational power of kinship, the other on a newly opened political space. 
Neither Creon nor Antigone could surrender — they acted within frameworks of 
rationalities of their own worlds. 
4. 
It is also the death of Socrates that Hegel describes in a similar tone. Death in the 
sense that someone is dying is not tragic in his view; it can be merely sad. "Real tragedy 
occurs only — he explains — where there are ethical forces on both sides and they collide 
with each other. ... In Socrates' fate the tragedy of Athens, the tragedy of Greece were 
exposed. We have here two forces which confront each other. One of them is the divine 
law, a naive, traditional custom .... The other principle is an equally divine law of 
consciousness, the right of knowledge (of subjective freedom); it is the fruit from the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil, i.e. reason ... These two principles clashed in 
Socrates' life andphilosophy"17. Let us add here the Hegelian saying from his Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy that "tragedies in which tyrants and innocent men play 
are flat; they are empty and irrational to a highest degree. The great man wants to be 
guilty, he takes up a great conflict". Antigone frightens with her drive to death much 
more than rational Socrates does. It seems to me that while Socrates had to die because 
the world of Ancient Greece could not tolerate a subjective will to knowledge yet, 
Antigone meets her failure because the modern world of split ethics and politics could 
no longer tolerate a subjective will to live in that old world which Hegel used to call 
a "political world of art" (and which was about to collapse). And just as it was 
Athenians' duty to condemn Socrates, it was also Creon's duty to condemn Antigone. 
They both resisted the existing order; Socrates did it in the name of (still unrecognized 
by Athenian prosecutors) future, Antigone — in the name of a (scarcely buried) past. 
Socrates wanted individual freedom, freedom of an individual who would no longer 
be saturated with the state — he put morality before objective ethics (Sittlichkeit) and 
he was bound to lose. Antigone wanted the right to close a human being in a (no longer 
available) totality of man-citizen. They are both innocent, but nevertheless so guilty 
17 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy in: I. Kroriska, Socrates, Warsaw, 1982. 
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in their innocence: innocent expressing a yet undiscovered (Socrates) or an already 
rejected (Antigone) principle, guilty - destroying the only principles existing at the 
time. The conflict of figures of Antigone and Socrates misunderstood by their own 
time has much in common with le différend. 
Max Scheler discussing the "tragedy of a noble man" once again reaches for a figure 
of Socrates, or rather to such an image of him that had been formed by Hegel's 
influential analyses. And although neither of the names is mentioned there, it seems 
that behind the generalization in question there is precisely that Hegel's particular 
example. Thus "'a noble man' — Scheler says — has to break 'moral law' or whatever 
can be a 'commandment' in the domain of morality. Actually without guilt, he ... 
necessarily has to appear to be ' guilty". At the same time a crowd of prosecutors "with 
clear conscience" fulfils their "bounden duty". The tragic is born from the fact that 
prosecutors cannot be condemned on "ethical" grounds. A tragic hero does not have 
to differ from a criminal in the eyes of his epoch. Moreover, he may even die as a 
criminal... Let us quote here in extenso that moving passage: "A tragic man steps his 
way among his 'contemporaries' calmly and without renown. He walks around 
unrecognized by the crowd; if he is not seen by people as a criminal. Lack of an instance 
which would draw a distinction between the former and the latter is not here casual, 
but necessary"18 . We can do justice to a tragic, lonely hero only in a different epoch -
just like in the case of idioms coined by Lyotard which "save (often after a long time) 
the honour of thinking". At present the "lack of an instance" in question is exactly 
"necessary" — a judgment devoid of a "wrong" will be passed only by the future. A 
tragic hero is not to be blamed for his "guilt", he is caught in it, says Scheler. It is guilt 
that comes to him, not the other way round. Antigone and Socrates are tragic with a 
different kind of the tragic... 
Both Antigone and Socrates suffer wrong in the Lyotardian sense of the term. But 
in the existing (and obligatory) language their wrong cannot be phrased. The Athenian 
prosecutors, similarly to Creon, act in a just manner in every respect. Socrates' too 
early language game as well as Antigone's too late language game are reduced to 
silence, remain unrealized, incomprehensible. The two heroes do not appear in the 
times proper to them. Socrates and Athenians, Antigone and Creon — these are 
differends between one law and another law, each of them being precisely a law rather 
than lawlessness (and therefore their individual fate is a tragic one). Hegel says about 
Socrates that he is a "hero who consciously recognized and expressed a higher principle 
of spirit", that yet unaccepted individuality. Antigone, on the other hand, was late with 
her law, she expressed the principle which had just been overcome by the constantly 
changing world. While Socrates was a "historical hero" who was defeated as an 
individual but the principle discovered by whom succeeded — because it was used by 
18 M. Scheler, op.cit, p. 90, p. 91, italics mine. 
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the "cunning of reason", Antigone was merely "manure" of history... She was not given 
a posthumous satisfaction that Socrates was given; her death was a death in vain, a 
death that could not change the course of history (although it still was an example of 
Belle Mort, beautiful death, which was later refused to prisoners in Auschwitz dying 
- as Adorno wrote - "as specimens"19. 
5. 
The Lyotardian conception of the differend allows one to take into consideration 
the question of an entanglement of two orders: the private and the public, in all its 
dramaticality and irresolvability. The solution put forward by Richard Rorty — stran-
geness of "solidarity" and "self-creation", their "incommensurability"20  — makes 
disappear the aura of tragedy which accompanies human choices from the highest 
existential registers (one could simply ask whether it is not the case that he "flattens" 
in his conception what cannot be "de-dramatized" if only tragedy should be inscribed 
in human fate). What Rorty would suggest? How would he solve our conflict of tragic 
reasons? Perhaps he might take the course of avoiding it as one of those age-old and 
never-to-be-solved perennial problems of philosophy? In other words, can a self-cre-
ating, Rortyan "liberal ironist" be a tragic figure in the sense given to the term here -
or perhaps the tragedy has been taken away from him with a radical pragmatic gesture? 
Can fantasies, idiosyncrasies, singular and unique philosophical idioms (as Rorty 
would like to see Derrida from La carte postale, Limited Inc. and Glas21) ever lead to 
a situation of a tragic, existential choice? It seems to us that the answer has to be in the 
negative as Pascal's dramatic struggles from his Pensées, Kierkegaard's uncertainty 
from Fear and Trembling, not to mention Nietzsche, Shestov or Camus, cannot be 
19 Adomo said in Negative Dialectics: The fact that in death camps died the specimen rather than 
the individual cannot not pertain to dying of those who have avoided these administrative means" (a 
Polish translation, p. 508). It is from here that the Adornian  "drastic guilt of those who have been saved" 
comes from... 
20 See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge, 1989. I am dealing in more 
detail with the nuances of Rorty's attitude toward the private and the public in the text "Rorty and 
Self-Creation" (A. Szahaj (ed.), Around R. Rorty's Philosophy, Toruri, 1995). 
21  The most fervent defender of Derrida against his "pragmaticization" by Rorty is probably 
Christopher Norris: starting with arguments of the kind of: "Rorty has no time for Derrida's more detailed 
or complex passages of textual argumentation" (in Derrida, Harvard, 1989, p. 150), through a 
sophisticated argumentation that it is precisely Rorty who is responsible for and lies at the basis of 
Habermas' misunderstanding of Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity ("Deconstruction, 
Postmodernism and Philosophy" in: Derrida: A Critical Reader, Oxford,1992, pp. 171-3) to his 
continuous philippics in almost every essay from What's Wrong with Postmodernism (Baltimore, 1990). 
A question appears whether Norris is not such a "authorized depository of truth" about Derrida as 
Searle is of Austin — which Derrida so masterfully deconstructs in Limited Inc, a b c... (Evanston, 1988, 
pp. 29-110). 
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heard in Rorty's writings. Tragedy — inscribed in the human condition by "existential", 
to use the broadest term, thinking — seems to be absent there22. While Lyotard had in 
mind detecting differends, Rorty in a polemics with him in PhilosophicalPapers would 
like to repress them, to replace differends with litigations, according to a more general 
idea of replacing force with persuasion. But that seems to be an option of political 
liberalism rather than a philosophical choice — an example of this title "priority of 
democracy to philosophy" in another essay23. 
Thus the question asked at the very beginning whether postmodernism in philosop-
hy really deprives human fate, culture, world — of the tragic, the dramatic, apocalypti-
cism, ability to choose or just, as Zygmunt Bauman wants somewhere else, bears 
"existential insecurity — ontological contingency of being"24 — divides in a multitude 
of questions, as many of them, to be exact, as many there are these "postmodernisms" 
in question. It seems to be problematic whether in Rorty' s world of "contingency" there 
is some room left for the drama of human fate. It seems possible to solve (overcome, 
avoid, repress) most contradictions according to him, to flatten the tragic of existential 
conflicts of reasons, take away from drama its horror, in a word — to "de-dramatize the 
world". But in Lyotard that is not the case, at least in Lyotard of his conception of le 
différend25. 
One could also ask the question whether the effect of a differend — i.e. a wrong -
is always tragic? Not necessarily, it seems. If we assumed that a tragic conflict of 
reasons is such in which both reasons are morally right and one of them has to give 
up, it would turn out that if a victim could simply become a plaintiff before some 
tribunal, the element of tragedy would disappear immediately. And a tribunal to judge 
a wrong in Lyotard's sense of the word does not exist — in a paradigmatically binding 
22 The significance of the private-public distinction in Rorty's philosophy is testified e.g. by his (as 
autobiographical as Pérégrinations... for Lyotard) text "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids". It was only after 
forty years of struggles — in his book on contingency. — that he realized that the two perspectives: that 
of solidarity and that of self-creation, cannot be united: it is impossible to unite "Trotsky" ("fight with 
social injustice") with "wild orchids" ("socially useless flowers"). Rorty says that it was only when he 
was writing Contingency... that he solved the problem: "[T]here is no need to weave one's personal 
equivalent of Trotsky and one's personal equivalent of my wild orchids together. Rather, one should 
try to abjure the temptation to tie one's moral responsibilities to other people with one's relations to 
whatever idiosyncratic things or persons one is obsessed with" (p. 147). 
23 R. Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism Without Emancipation" in: Philosophical Papers, vol. I, Cambridge, 
p. 217, p. 218. 
24 See Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Introduction, London, 1992. 
25 It is worth adding that also Michel Foucault "de-dramatizes" the modem world when in Surveiller 
et punirhe shows the point of transition from the theatre of pain (how difficult it is to forget the opening 
scenes from the book!) to the theatre of surveillance, punishment, in a word — to Panopticon. Neither 
power nor resistance to it are dramatic—power penetrates everything as it is "capillary", while resistance 
to it is hopeless, for which Foucault is even today often reproached (cf. e.g. quite a representative 
criticism by Edward Said in "Criticism and the Imagination of Power" dealing with the paradox that is 
bom when one realizes that Foucault's analyses of power detect its injustice and cruelty, while his 
theoretizations demonstrate unavoidability of presence of such power, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, 
ed. D. Hoy, Oxford, 1986). 
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picture of the world a wrong can be neither phrased, nor represented. A wrong is only 
looking for new forms of expression. Lyotard says that in order for the wrong to find 
an expression and for the plaintiff to cease being a victim philosophizing (always in 
experimental, judging coup par coup, case by case, respecting singularity of an event) 
has to search for new rules for the formation and linking of phrases ... a new 
competence (or 'prudence' )" (LD, p. 13). The differend is such a situation in language 
when something that ought to be phrased in it — that begs for being phrased in it - cannot 
be phrased. At least cannot be phrased immediately, within existing representational 
frameworks and according to binding criteria. It is therefore, let us add, that Lyotardian 
justice is neither a discovered norm or an invented one, but always a horizon out of 
our reach. Each judgment passed without a criterion — which has been known at least 
since Aristotle and his judge guided by phronesis — must assume that it will be judged 
itself. And then next judgement, and then next once again, and so ad infinitum 6. The 
Lyotardian account of justice does not tell us how to judge, it merely makes us sensitive 
to unavoidable necessity of judging itself (ethical necessity, let us make it clear). 
Judging in the form of linking (adding) phrases to existing ones is necessary though 
contingent — Lyotard says the following: "It is necessary to link, but the mode of linkage 
is never necessary" (LD, § 41). If there occurs an event, a previously existing 
representational framework is destroyed, so for this event to be judged one has to find 
a peculiar, singular idiom precisely for this case. In the case of language games "justice" 
would equal resistance to the situation in which a certain game becomes a meta-game, 
a meta-language, providing rules and criteria to all other games. 
The meta-game most attacked by Lyotard is that of cognitive rules to which other, 
heterogeneous and irreducible games of ethics, politics or aesthetics are reduced 
(which always gives birth to a differend). It is also sometimes the case that politics 
becomes an existing meta-game — especially with respect to ethics or aesthetics. 
Perhaps it might be said that the only acceptable case in which heteronous character 
of language games could be broken is the case of a "wrong" — and simply transcendental 
hegemony of duties, obligations, in a word — of ethics. But that is a story to be told in 
another micrology... 27 
26 See J.-F. Lyotard (with J.L Thébaud) Just Gaming, Manchester, 1985, pp. 25-29. 
27  I want to express my deep gratitude to Professor Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska for a number of 
inspiring suggestions made after reading of a draft version of the present text. The text has benefited 
greatly from Professor Marek J. Siemek's years' long seminars in ancient philosophy. 
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